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Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit
Repayments: Resolving An Apparent
Conflict
Robert M. Nelson
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that
certain corporate "insiders" must repay to the corporation any profit they
receive as a result of short-swing trading in registered equity securities
of that corporation. For a number of years there has been considerable
debate over whether such a repayment, when made, is deductible
under the federal tax laws. It is the author's thesis that the courts and
commentators that have dealt with the question have misconstrued the
purpose of section 16(b) and have failed to take into account the eco-
nomic realities of insider repayments. He contends that section 16(b)
is a carefully balanced mechanism to achieve a specific purpose - deter-
rence of insider trading by non-punitive means. To ensure that the pre-
cise policy of 16(b) is not frustrated, the author suggests that the courts
analyze the economic effect of a deduction and that in appropriate cases
the "frustration of public policy" rationale be used to deny all or a part of
an otherwise valid deduction, when to allow such would frustrate the
16(b) policy of non-punitive deterrence.
INTRODUCTION
ECAUSE THE VAST BODY of federal statutory law was,
obviously, not enacted as a unified program, often more than
one federal statute will have an effect upon a particular area or
problem; in these instances of
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overlapping coverage by two or
more federal statttes, it is in-
evitable that the statutes will at
times conflict. Such con-
flicts may often be reconciled
through judicial interpretations.
There are, however, instances
when nothing short of statutory
amendment will suffice to re-
solve a conflict arising from
overlapping legislation.
One conflict that has plagued the courts for some time arises
from the relationship between the repayment of insider profits under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act)' and the deduction of such repayments under various provi-
1 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Section 16(b) provides, in relevant part:
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sions of the Internal Revenue Code. Typically this conflict arises as
follows: X, a person covered by section 16(a) of the Exchange
Act as an insider of ABC Corporation,2 purchases and sells, or sells
and purchases, the common stock of ABC Corporation within a 6
month period, thereby realizing a section 16(b) profit. X is then
required to repay his profit to ABC Corporation pursuant to section
16(b) of the Exchange Act.3 Having made the repayment, X claims
a deduction on his federal income tax return equal to the amount of
the repayment. The Commissioner then disallows the deduction
contending that it would weaken the deterrent effect of section
16(b) and thus frustrate the public policy underlying that section.
The insider, on the other hand, contends that he is entitled to the
deduction as an ordinary and necessary business expense under sec-
tion 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.4
It is clear from this example that the aggregate effect upon the
insider of the realization and repayment of short-swing insider prof-
its will depend upon the application of provisions of both the Ex-
change Act and the Internal Revenue Code. It is my contention
that the appropriate sections of these statutes can be applied so as
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of
his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months.
2 The persons covered under § 16(a) of the Exchange Act are the officers and direc-
tors of any issuer which has any equity security registered under § 12 of the Exchange
Act or any shareholder who directly or indirectly is the beneficial owner of more than
10 percent of any class of any equity security of the issuer which is registered under
§ 12 of theExchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
a If X's § 16(b) repayment liability stems from his being a beneficial owner of
more than 10 percent of a class of equity security as provided in § 16(a), then that
liability is restricted to profits from transactions in which X was such an owner both at
the time of the purchase and the sale. Thus if X buys 13 percent of a corporation's
outstanding stock on January 1, and then in two completely separate transactions sells
3.1 percent on January 15 and the remaining 9.9 percent on January 16, X is only liable
for his profits from the January 15 sale. Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.,
404 U.S. 418 (1972).
4 In the cases decided to date the insider has been an officer or director and has
claimed an ordinary and necessary business expense deduction under § 162(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Section 162 (a) provides in relevant part: "There shall be al-
lowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ...... Int Rev. Code of 1954 § 162(a).
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to adequately handle the repayment-deduction issue without distorting
either federal statute for the sake of the other.
II. JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
In order to place the repayment-deduction issue in proper per-
spective, it is necessary to examine the development of the case law
to date.5 The Tax Court's first examination of section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act occurred in William F. Davis, Jr.6 Davis, a director
of United Drug, Inc., sold 1000 shares of United Drug stock for
$25,441.50. Less than six months later he purchased 2,000 shares
of United Drug under the terms of an executives' stock option plan.
United Drug requested that Davis pay to the corporation $12,659,
the difference between the proceeds from the sale and the cost of
1,000 of the 2,000 shares he later purchased.7  Davis repaid these
profits to United Drug and claimed a federal income tax deduction
equal to the amount of the repayment.8
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction contending that the
repayment of insider profits pursuant to section 16(b) of the Ex-
change Act was in the nature of a penalty. The Tax Court upheld
the disallowance of the deduction, stating that the essential question
is whether allowance of the deduction would frustrate public pol-
icy; 9 the court concluded that the payment of profits was a penalty
and that deduction of the payment would frustrate public policy by
weakening the deterrent effect of section 16(b).1°
5 In recent years there has been considerable interest in the tax effects of the repay-
ment of insider profits under § 16(b). See Darrell, The Tax Treatment of Payments
Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 64 HARv. L. REv. 80
(1950); Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Un-
der Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 GA. L. REv. 298 (1970);
Insider Profit Repayments - Deductibility, TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM, No.
71-25, 3 (Dec. 13, 1971); Bureau of National Affairs, Conflict? Exchange Act,
Sec. 16(b) v. Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 162, SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 129,
B-1 (Dec. 1, 1971); Note, Tax Treatment of Payments for Apparent Violations of Sec-
tion 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 736 (1972);
Note, Repayment of Profits Realized in Violation of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by a Corporate Officer in Order to Protect His Corporate Posi-
tion and Business Reputation is Deductible by Him as an Ordinary and Necessary Busi-
ness Expense, 9 HOUsTON L. REV. 841 (1972).
6 17 T.C. 549 (1951).
7id. at 554.
8 Davis based his claim for deduction on §§ 23(a)(1) and 23(e) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. Section 23(a)(1), the ordinary and necessary business expense
deduction, was the forerunner of § 162(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code; sec-
tion 23(e), which allowed a deduction for losses incurred by an individual taxpayer, was
the predecessor of § 165(c) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
9 17 T.C. at 555.
10 In reaching its conclusion that the section 16(b) payment was a penalty, the Tax
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In Laurence M. Marks," decided shortly after Davis,2 the Tax
Court came to a different conclusion. Marks was a director of
Shamrock Oil and Gas Corporation and senior partner of an invest-
ment banking firm that had made purchases and sales of Shamrock
stock on several occasions within periods of six months. As a part-
ner, Marks' share of the profits from these transactions was
$17,672.08, which he later repaid to Shamrock. Marks claimed a
deduction for the repayment as either an ordinary and necessary
business expense under section 23(a) (1) or as a loss under section
23(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.11 Relying on Davis
the Commissioner disallowed the deduction.
The Tax Court, however, reversed the Commissioner and allowed
Marks' deduction. The court was influenced by three factors: the
petitioner's unblemished reputation in the investment community; 4
Court reasoned that the objective of section 16(b) was punitive rather than remedial.
The Davis court stated that Davis' payment did not remedy any injury to United Drug
or its shareholders and that, in fact, there had been no injury to the corporation or to
its shareholders in the first place. The sole purpose of the § 16(b) payment, the court
noted, is to deter insiders from unfairly using inside information to reap profits for
themselves. Thus, since § 16(b)'s objective is to deter, rather than to rectify, insider
abuses, it is punitive in nature. On this basis, the court reasoned that the allowance
of a deduction for a § 16(b) payment would weaken the deterrent effect intended by
Congress and would, therefore, be against the public policy of curbing insider abuses,
the underpinning of § 16(b). Id. at 557-58. The Internal Revenue Service agreed
with the Davis decision when it stated in 1952, that no deduction should be allowed for
the repayment of insider profits because the section 16(b) sanction is in the nature of a
penalty and allowance of a deduction would, therefore, frustrate public policy. I.T.
4069, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 28.
1127 T.C. 464 (1956).
12 In Robert Lehman, 25 T.C. 629 (1955), the first case after Davis raising the is-
sue of a deduction for the repayment of insider profits, Lehman, a director of Pan Amer-
ican Airways Corporation, realized short-swing "profits" in a sale-purchase transaction
in 1943. Lehman repaid his "profits" to Pan American in 1945 and claimed a deduc-
tion. It was disallowed by the Commissioner. In upholding the disallowance, the
Lehman court stated, without further comment:
This issue [the deductibility of the repayment of insider profits] was exten-
sively discussed in William P. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1951), and a holding
reached adverse to the petitioner. That case is dispositive of this issue and
we hold that no deduction is allowable to the petitioner with respect to such
repayment. Id. at 635.
13 See note 8 supra.
14 As the court put it:
At the time that the matter of the transactions in Shamrock stock was under dis-
cussion, petitioner was a vice president of the Investment Bankers Association
of America. He was expected to be, and in the following year was, elected
president of that organization. He has served as a governor of the New York
Stock Exchange, as a governor of the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., and on various committees of the New York Stock Exchange, as well
as on many charitable boards. He has an excellent reputation in the business
and financial fields as an investment banker and director. 27 T.C. at 464.
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the subsequent exemption from section 16(b) coverage of some of
the transactions which resulted in Marks' liability;15 and the indi-
rect purchase and sale of the stock in the name of Marks' invest-
ment firm rather than directly by Marks himself. 6 The court
concluded that the allowance of a deduction in Marks would not ob-
struct the prevention of the unfair use of insider information, the
goal of section 16(b). The court distinguished Davis, pointing out
that in that case -[tjhe deduction sought was denied . . . because it
was felt that under the facts there its allowance would as a matter
of fact violate sharply defined public policy....
The Tax Court followed the position it took in Marks in Wil-
liam L. Mitchell.18 Mitchell, an officer of General Motors, sold and
then within six months repurchased GM stock at a lower price.
Mitchell repaid the resulting section 16(b) profit to the corporation
and deducted that amount from his income tax. Although the
Mitchell facts paralleled those of Davis more closely than those of
Marks,'9 the Tax Court stated that "the case of Laurence M. Marks
... [is] directly in point.- 20  The court thus held that the facts and
evidence presented by the petitioner established that he was entitled
15 In December, 1947, Marks' firm purchased 14,800 shares of Shamrock, part of a
public offering, in order to avoid the unfavorable impact that this unsold portion of
the public offering might have had upon the then prevailing market price of the Sham-
rock shares. In subsequent months, the firm sold these shares to the public and partic-
ipated in a secondary distribution of 163,303 shares of Shamrock stock. These types
of transactions were exempted from section 16(b) by rule of the SEC after the Marks
transaction. Rule 16b-2 exempts certain transactions effected in connection with a dis-
tribution of a substantial block of securities if (1) the person engaging in the transac-
tion is doing so in the ordinary course of business; (2) the block of securities is pur-
chased by such person from the issuer or another person with a view to the distribu-
tion of the securities; and (3) other persons are engaged in the distribution on terms
equal to those afforded such person. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-2 (1969). Although it is
not clear from the Marks opinion, rule 16b-2 appears to be the exemption to which
the court referred.
16 The court found that "[t]here was a serious question as to whether [Marks] was
in fact liable under section 16(b) .... ." 27 T.C. at 467. Although it is not clear
from the opinion, the question of Marks' liability seems to have arisen from the fact
that Marks did not directly participate in the trading. The court pointed out that Sham-
rock was advised by its attorney that "no case had determined whether a partnership
with a member of the type described in section 16(b), or such partner, was liable
thereunder ... "i d. at 466.
17 27 T.C. at 469 (emphasis added).
18 52 T.C. 170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
909 (1971).
9 In both Davis and Mitchell, the insider transaction was a sale followed by a pur-
chase, which produces no realized gain, and therefore in both no tax liability was in-
curred on the § 16(b) transaction. Marks, however, involved several purchase-sale trans-
actions that did produce income tax liability for the insider profits.
20 52 T.C. at 173.
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to an ordinary and necessary business expense deduction under the
rule of law announced in Marks.2'
The court in Mitchell rejected a contention by the Commissioner
that the petitioner was only entitled to a capital loss, an argument
based on the Supreme Court's rationale in Arrowsmith v. Commis-
sioner.22 In Arrowsmith the taxpayer had received distributions
from a corporation in connection with a complete liquidation of
the corporation, and, in a subsequent tax year, had claimed an ordi-
nary loss for his payment of a judgment rendered on an obligation
of the corporation. The United States Supreme Court disallowed the
taxpayer's claim for an ordinary loss, reasoning that the nature of
the loss must be characterized in the same manner as the earlier dis-
tribution since the loss was incurred by the taxpayer solely because
he was a recipient of that earlier distribution. Since the distribution
had produced capital gain, the subsequent loss must be character-
ized as capital loss.
The Tax Court, however, pointed out that Mitchell's loss was
not related to his earlier sale but rather was directly related to his
purchase of the stock. There were, the court reasoned, two separate
transactions. The first transaction, consisting of the purchase and
sale of GM stock, had tax significance because it resulted in a capi-
tal gain. The second transaction, involving the sale of the stock
and then a purchase within six months, produced no taxable gain
and thus had only securities law significance. Since the repayment
related to the second transaction, the court refused to say that the
capital gain character of the profits of the first transaction neces-
sitated capital treatment of the subsequent loss.
The court noted that Arrowsmith was inapplicable for another
reason: no relationship existed between the amount of capital gain
Mitchell realized on his initial sale of GM stock and the amount
of his subsequent section 16(b) profit. The independence of these
sums is dearly demonstrated by the fact that the measure of the
section 16(b) profit inuring to the issuer as a result of the purchase
would have remained the same even if the initial sale had actually
resulted in a capital loss to Mitchell. 23
21 The repayment was found to be an ordinary and necessary business expense de-
duction because it was an expense incurred for the protection of the taxpayer's business
reputation. According to the court, the repayment was made to avoid litigation and
the damaging publicity to the taxpayer's business reputation that might accompany it.
22344 U.S. 6 (1951).
2 3 See 52 T.C. at 174. If X Corporation stock with a basis of $20 is sold for $10
($10 loss), and with six months other X Corporation stock is acquired for $5, there is
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The Commissioner appealed the decision in Mitchell to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which reversed
the Tax Court and held that Mitchell was entitled to only a capital
loss rather than an ordinary and necessary business expense deduc-
tion. 4 According to the Sixth Circuit the Tax Court was at a disad-
vantage when it decided Mitchell because it did not have the benefit
of the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Skelly Oil Co.25 The court was "convinced that if the Tax Court
had considered Skelly Oil, it would have applied the Arrowsmith
doctrine in Mitchell and held that the amount paid by the taxpayer
to General Motors must be treated as a capital loss deduction."'2 6
In Skelly Oil, the corporation was required to repay income which
had been taxed after a 27.5 percent oil depletion allowance. Skelly
Oil deducted the full amount of the repayment as an ordinary deduc-
tion but the Commissioner disallowed it. The Supreme Court held
that the corporation had to reduce its deduction by the amount of the
depletion allowance in order to offset the tax benefit it had already
received as a result of that allowance. In accordance with Arrow-
smith, the Court reasoned that if money was taxed at a special lower
rate when received, the taxpayer would 'be allowed an unfair tax
windfall if repayments were generally deductible at the higher rate
applicable to ordinary income.
The Sixth Circuit in Mitchell relied upon both Skelly Oil and
Arrowsmith. The court pointed out that Mitchell had been taxed
at favorable capital gain rates when he sold his GM stock and that
if he were now allowed an ordinary deduction for the insider prof-
its repayment, he would be receiving favorable tax treatment twice.2s
James E. Anderson29 was the first case subsequent to the Sixth
a $5 "profit" that inures to X Corporation. See 2 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION
1062 (2d ed. 1961).
24 Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g 52 T.C. 170
(1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
25394 U.S. 678 (1969).
26 428 F.2d at 260. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained that the
Skelly Oil decision had been announced on April 21, 1969, only 9 days before the Tax
Court opinion in Mitchell. Id. at 262.
27 In 1958, Skelly Oil had refunded over $500,000 to two of its customers for over-
charges in the six preceding years. The company had been setting its prices during those
years on the basis of a minimum price order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commis-
sioner. 'When the Commissioner's order was vacated, several of Skelly Oil's customers
filed claims for the overcharges. The overcharges had been reported as income during
this period and, as such, had received the benefit of the oil depletion allowance.
28428 F.2d at 261.
29 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
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Circuit's decision in Mitchell to present the Tax Court with the is-
sue of the tax deductibility of section 16(b) repayments. The factual
pattern in Anderson was quite similar to Mitchell. Anderson, an of-
ficer of Zenith Radio Corporation, sold Zenith shares at a substan-
tial profit and reported the profit as a long-term capital gain. Less
than six months after the sale, Anderson purchased Zenith shares at
a price lower than his earlier sales price. Anderson repaid the
section 16(b) profit to Zenith and deducted the amount of the re-
payment as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Relying
upon Mitchell, the Commissioner disallowed the deduction and
ruled that Anderson was entitled only to a capital loss.
The Tax Court reversed the Commissioner's ruling and held
that Anderson was entitled to an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense deduction under section 162 (a). 30 The court concluded that
Skelly Oil and Arrowsmith did not apply to the Anderson situation:
We see no need to restate our reasons for holding that Arrow-
smith does not apply herein. They are fully set forth in our opin-
ion in Mitchell. It is sufficient to emphasize that in Arrowsmith
the payment which the taxpayer was called upon to make arose
out of his status as a shareholder of the corporation; he was re-
quired to meet an obligation which attached to the assets which
he had received in the course of a corporate liquidation. The same
analysis disposes of Skelly Oil. In that case, the taxpayer was a
supplier, which received sums from its customers in an earlier year
against which it took a depletion deduction. When it refunded
that money in a later year, it was carrying out obligations imposed
upon it as that same supplier with respect to those same funds.
In the instant case, the situation is quite different. Here, the
sale was made by petitioner in his capacity as a stockholder of
Zenith. His obligation to make the payment in question arose out
of his status as an employee of Zenith. Neither the sale or pur-
chase nor combination thereof imposed any obligation upon him.
Thus, Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil are both distinguishable because
the payment was not directly and integrally related to the earlier
sale transaction which gave rise to the capital gain and because the
status of petitioner in making the payment differed from that
which he had at the time such gain was realized. 31
30 The Tax Court found that Anderson was engaged in the business of being a cor-
porate executive and that the § 16(b) repayment was made in connection with this "busi-
ness." The petitioner proved to the satisfaction of the court that he believed that his
employment with Zenith might have been jeopardized if he had refused to make the
repayment. The court noted that under his employment agreement with Zenith, he
earned $50,000 annually, but that Zenith could terminate his employment at any time.
In the event of termination, Anderson would be retained in an "advisory" capacity at
an annual compensation of $20,000. Id. at 1371-72.
3 Id. at 1374-75. It is curious that the Tax Court chose to use status in this case as a
determining factor in distinguishing Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil. If the individual
were covered under 16(b) of the Exchange Act by virtue of his being a 10 percent share-
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Anderson demonstrates that the Tax Court has chosen to stand
staunchly by the position it took in Mitchell that an officer is entitled
to an ordinary and necessary business expense deduction for the re-
payment of insider profits. Anderson also marks the Tax Court's
second rejection of Arrowsmith as a basis for analyzing this prob-
lem, as well as a rejection of the Sixth Circuit's suggestion that
Skelly Oil, in conjunction with Arrowsmith, dictates that the insider
receive only a capital loss for the repayment of his insider profits.
Thus, the current status of the law pertaining to the deductibility
of repayments under 16(b) of the Exchange Act may be summarized
as follows: First, it is clear that the Tax Court, except in the Sixth
Circuit, will allow an insider who is an officer or director to claim
an ordinary and necessary business deduction for the repayment of
insider profits.3 2 Second, the ordinary and necessary business expense
deduction will be allowed irrespective of the type of transaction that
produced the insider profit.3 Third, in the Sixth Circuit, the direc-
tor or officer will be allowed a capital loss rather than ordinary de-
duction.34 And finally, the tax treatment of an insider who is a 10
percent shareholder but not an officer or director remains an open
question.3 5
III. THE CASE LAW - A CRITICAL VIEW
Initially it should be noted that the only courts that have been
confronted with this issue, the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, have come to contradictory conclusions. More impor-
tantly, however, neither court has paused to examine the economic
aspects of the issue. It is submitted that if such an examination were
undertaken, the rationales of both courts would be found untenable.
holder in the corporation rather than being an officer and director, both the sale that
results in the violation and the subsequent repayment of the 16(b) profit will be made
in his capacity as a shareholder. Thus, status will no longer be available as a distin-
guishing factor, unless being an insider by virtue of being a 10 percent shareholder is
different than being a shareholder in the ordinary sense. In any event, the two trans-
actions, that is the initial sale and the subsequent repayment following a purchase, are
unrelated in the framework of the tax laws and the tax treatment of one should not
influence the tax treatment of the other.
32 james E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971); Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464
(1956).
3 See cases cited in note 32, supra.
34 Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g, 52 T.C. 170
(1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
35 None of the decided cases have involved an insider who was a more than 10
percent shareholder. For a detailed discussion of the status of the shareholder-insider,
see text accompanying notes 87-100 infra.
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The Commissioner's and Sixth Circuit Court's view that an in-
sider is entitled to only a capital loss for the repayment of insider
profits is unpersuasive. The arguments of the Tax Court in Mit-
chell and Anderson militate against the application of Arrowsmith
or Skelly Oil to the insider situation. If the Arrowsmith rationale
cannot be used to characterize the transactions as capital in nature,
then in order to do so one would have to find some support in the
Internal Revenue Code itself. Under the provisions of the Code,
however, a short-term capital loss is defined as a "loss from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months.
. . .,' while a long-term capital loss is defined as a "loss from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months.
. . .,,3 In a sale-purchase transaction, the repayment of the insider
profit is not related to "a sale or exchange of a capital asset," but
rather relates to the purchase of a capital asset.3 8  Thus, character-
izing such repayments as capital losses, as the Commissioner and the
Sixth Circuit would do, is without support in either the Code or the
related case law.
The Tax Court also, has failed to provide a viable solution to the
repayment-deduction problem. First, the court's decisions have not
furnished a tenable rationale to support its position that an ordinary
and necessary business expense deduction should be allowed for in-
sider repayments, especially in light of the "frustration of public
policy" doctrine. In Marks, the initial Tax Court case to permit the
deduction, the court justified the allowance by the bald conclusion
that this would not frustrate the public policy of section 16(b). The
court did not, however, define the public policy of section 16(b) or
explain why the allowance of the deduction would not frustrate such
policy. Moreover, the Tax Court in Marks failed to adequately dis-
tinguish the Davis case. Refusing to explicitly overrule Davis, the
Marks court took the position that Davis and Marks were distin-
3 6INT. REn. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(2) (emphasis added).
37Id. § 1222(4) (emphasis added).
38This point raises the theoretical question of whether 16(b), in a sale-purchase
transaction, is concerned with the use of inside information at the time of the sale or
at the time of the subsequent purchase. It would seem that since the "profit realized"
is the difference between the sale price and the price at the subsequent purchase, the
statute must operate on the assumption that the inside information would be used at
the time of the sale. The statute does not prohibit, however, the sale itself but rather
uses the purchase to trigger the violation. Thus, it is reasonable to characterize the re-
payment as related to the purchase, rather than to the sale of a capital asset. It should
be noted that to characterize the repayment as "related to" the purchase of capital as-
sets is not to say that it is a cost of acquisition such as to give rise to a basis adjustment.
See note 68 infra & accompanying text.
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guishable "on. the facts." This apparent change in position without
adequate justification is a fundamental weakness in the Tax Court's
handling of the repayment-deduction issue.
In addition, both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals have
failed to examine the actual economic effect of the deduction in the
specific factual situations before them. 9 The Mitchell insider trans-
action, if analyzed in this manner, would perhaps have led the Tax
Court to a different conclusion than it reached. Mitchell's "profit"
of $17,939.29 was a purely paper profit caused by the application of
section 16(b) to his sale-purchase transaction. This transaction had
no tax significance since there was no realized gain for federal in-
come tax purposes. Nevertheless, Mitchell claimed, and was allowed
by the Tax Court, an ordinary and necessary business expense deduc-
tion in an amount equal to the amount of the insider "profit" -
$17,939.29. Assuming that Mitchell was in a 50 percent tax brack-
et, the value of this deduction to him would be $8,969.65. Although
Mitchell originally repaid this entire profit to the corporation, the
net effect to Mitchell of the repayment followed by allowance of an
ordinary deduction is to permit him to repay only $8,969.65, one-half
of the amount of his insider profit. It is difficult to imagine that
such a result would not frustrate the policy underlying section 16(b)
of the Exchange Act.40 Nevertheless, this is exactly what the Tax
Court decision in Mitchell would have permitted, and the Sixth Cir-
cuit by allowing a capital loss reaches the same result, though to a
lesser degree.
IV. A SUGGESTIED APPROACH
It is possible to approach the repayment-deduction issue in such
a way as to avoid the weaknesses of the approach presently em-
ployed by the courts. More importantly, the approach I shall sug-
gest is intended to adequately handle all types of insider transactions
and to treat all insiders equally, without distorting either the Ex-
change Act or the Internal Revenue Code for the sake of the other.
Essentially, the suggested approach will allow a deduction in those
situations where it would further the policy of section 16(b) and to
disallow the deduction when it would frustrate that policy.
39 In Davis, for example, the Tax Court stated the general proposition that allow-
ance of a deduction would frustrate the public policy underlying § 16(b), but it did so
without examining the actual economic effect of allowing Davis' deduction, and with-
out considering that there might be circumstances where the allowance of the deduc-
tion would not frustrate the enforcement of § 16(b).
40 Cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
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A. The Policy of Section 16(b)
The policy underlying section 16(b) should be the deciding fac-
tor in determining whether to allow or disallow a deduction for the
repayment of insider profits, if such a process can take place without
frustrating a provision or policy of the Internal Revenue Code. It
is essential, therefore, to examine the policy of section 16(b).
The policy of section 16(b) is clearly set forth in the section it-
self:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such [insider] by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer
... within any period of less than six months ... shall inure to
and be recoverable by the issuer ... 41
It-is important to note that section 16(b) requires repayment of
merely the "profit realized," 42 and not of a greater or lesser sum.
It is evidently the intent of section 16(b) that the insider simply be
deterred from participating in short-swing transactions, rather than
punished in the strict sense because he traded. But the deterrent
may be more than the prospect that the insider's economic position
will be reversed with precision; i.e., the "profit realized" referred to
in section 16(b) may not be directly proportionate to the economic
profit or loss experienced by the "short swinger.' 43
41 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
42 It should be noted that the "profit realized" in section 16(b) is not necessarily
tax, or even economic, realization. In fact an economic loss in a transaction will not
exclude a 16(b) profit. See notes 49, 50, infra & accompanying text.
43 It can be argued, perhaps, that Congress intended repayment under § 16(b) to
operate in addition to any tax liability incurred by the insider. Certainly, in the pur-
chase-sale transaction and in at least one sale-purchase, the short sale, Congress knew
that the insider would incur a tax liability for the realization of his gain. Therefore,
should not the taxpayer be denied a deduction for the repayment of his profit even in
the purchase-sale transaction because to allow a deduction would frustrate the policy un-
derlying section 16(b)? Although this argument is not without some basis in fact and
logic, it is, nevertheless, not persuasive. As one commentator has urged:
Absolute prohibition of short-term trading would have operated with undue
harshness in many instances. For example, an insider who has purchased may
be forced to sell within six months thereafter, by an unexpected personal need
for funds. Or an insider may purchase stock to support the market for the
company's shares. Such trading would not violate the purposes of [§ 16(b)],
if the insider did not benefit unfairly from inside information. Congress ap-
patently recognized justification for short-swing insider trading in some cases
and determined that the temptation to profit unfairly by such transactions
would be effectively checked by making the trading profitless. It is at least
arguable, therefore, that a tax result which effects an ultimate after-tax cost to
the insider in excess of the profit recoverable by the corporation would frus-
srate, rather than serve, the policy expressed in section 16(b) by upsetting the
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While the legislative history of the section is not conclusive,
it tends to support this view.44 The earlier drafts of the bill had an
outright prohibition against short-swing trading, but this was con-
sidered too severe a penalty, bringing with it, among other things,
the criminal sanctions of the Act.45  It is fairly clear then that the
statute was not meant to serve as punishment, at least in the criminal
sense. Further, one of the draftsmen indicated that it was the intent
to hold the insider liable regardless of his intent to make an unfair
profit, but at the same time allow him to engage in short-swing trans-
actions if he found it necessary: "Let him get out what he put in,
but give the corporation the profit. '46  It would seem, therefore,
that rather careful consideration was given to the method of deter-
rence adopted in section 16(b), and that it was intended to be exact-
ing, though not penal, in nature.
Some support is also to be found in the case law interpreting
section 16(b). In Adler v. Klawens47 the Second Circuit found that
for purposes of construction and intrepretation the statute was to be
considered remedial:
The objective was not to punish but to deter the persons in these
three categories - directors, officers, 10% beneficial owners -
from making improper use of information gained in a representa-
tive capacity. The practices could not be prevented in toto but
Congress sought to take the profit out of what it considered im-
proper conduct. It is plainly a remedial step, as opinions of this
court have indicated, even though in certain circumstances the rem-
edy seems harsh.48
That the statute can be harsh in wringing the profit out of a trans-
action is well illustrated by Learned Hand's opinion in another Sec-
ond Circuit case.49 In that case the defendant, in a series of trans-
actions covered by 16(b), suffered an economic loss of over
$400,000, but incurred a 16(b) liability of $300,000, the amount of
closely balanced sanction thereby imposed. Lokken, supra note 5, at 303
(footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
44 See generally, H.R. REP. Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); SEN.
REP. Nos. 792, 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
4 15 Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84, 56,
and 97, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6430 (1934).
461d. at 6557.
47267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
48 d. at 844.
49 Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). For
a further examination of computation of profit see 2 L. Loss, SEcUInES REGULAMTON
1062-66 (1961); 5 id. at 3024-27 (1969).
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his section 16(b) *'profit."50 Thus, though the statute is remedial, it
is strict in its remedy.
What is evident from all of this is that the statute is a strange,
though carefully planned, instrument for achieving a rather specific
goal: the deterrence of short-swing insider trading. As a former
chairman of the SEC and one of its Special Counsel wrote:
We are unaware of any other statute that offers a precise anal-
ogy to this subsection. It has within it elements of an ordinary
shareholder's derivative suit for damages based upon a breach of
fiduciary duty, elements of a statutory action for punitive damages,
and elements of an informer's statute .... The courts have found
each of these analogies useful, but none furnishes compelling au-
thority.51
In short, section 16(b) is sui generis. It is a carefully balanced
mechanism to provide for deterrence and at the same time allow for
activity. This balance is achieved by requiring the insider to repay his
"profit," but only his "profit," which is the difference between the
purchase and sale or sale and purchase price. Further, it should be
noted that there are two separate points here: first, while the statute
is meant to be a deterrent, it is not meant to absolutely prohibit in-
sider trading activity; and second, the repayment of the profit real-
ized is not meant to reverse the insider's economic position with
precision. It is this concept which should be the starting point for
examining the repayment-deduction issue.
B. Analysis of Transactions and Examination of
Potential Tax Effects
The tax effects to the insider of his repayment to the corporation
are an integral part of the repayment transaction and must there-
fore be considered in the calculation of the net amount that the in-
sider actually loses as a result of section 16(b). In some circum-
stances, allowance of a deduction will result in a net loss of less
than the insider profit; in others, disallowance of the deduction will
result in loss of more than the insider profit. To ensure that the in-
sider suffers a loss no greater or less than his 16(b) repayment, the
economic effects of the allowance or disallowance of a deduction
must be analyzed under the particular facts of each insider transac-
tion.
50See 2 L. Loss, supra note 49, at 1063-64 & n.118, and text accompanying notes
81-85, in!ra.
51 Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv.
L. REv. 385, 408 (1953).
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As a general rule, a deduction should be allowed only to the
extent necessary to offset the tax cost of insider profit repayment in
order not to disturb the carefully balanced mechanism of 16(b). This
principle requires that a policy of automatically allowing a deduction
for all insider profit repayments be rejected, as an economic analy-
sis of various possible inside transactions illustrates.
1. The Purchase-Sale Transaction.- A purchase-sale transac-
tion involves a purchase followed by a sale within six months. The
sale may result in a taxable short-term capital gain.52 If a director-
insider, X, purchases stock in his corporation for $10 and less than
six months later sells that stock for $20, he has a short-term capital
gain of $10. If X subsequently repays his profit to the corporation
and takes no deduction for that repayment, he is losing more than
his insider profit; he is losing the tax on that profit as well. Assum-
ing that X is in a 50-percent tax bracket he would pay $5 in in-
come taxes on his $10 short-term capital gain.53 If he then repays
the $10 profit under section 16(b), his total out-of-pocket expense
is $15, which is more than the insider profit he is required to pay
under section 16(b).
This inequitable result can be rectified if the insider is permitted
a deduction producing a tax benefit in an amount equal to the tax
cost of the transaction. The allowance of an ordinary deduction
equal to the amount of the repayment would result in such a tax
benefit, when there is short-term capital gain. Thus, if X is allowed
a deduction for the amount of his $10 repayment, he obtains a tax
benefit of $5, which exactly offsets the amount of his tax cost and re-
sults in a net payment by X of his profit and no more.
It is possible, however, for a purchase-sale transaction to result
in long-term capital gain, or even a loss, and at the same time re-
suit in 16(b) liability. In determining realized gain for tax purposes,
5 2 As stated in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(1): '"he term 'short-term capital
gain' means gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for not more than 6
months, if and to the extent such gain is taken into account in computing gross income."
(emphasis added). In order to be recoverable under § 16(b), the gain must be due to
a purchase and sale which occurred in less than six months; thus, the gain produced by
a purchase-sale transaction which violates § 16(b) will of necessity be short-term capi-
tal gain, if the stock sold is the same as that purchased.
The statement in the text assumes that X has no short-term losses, long-term capi-
tal gains, or long-term capital losses from securities transactions other than those cov-
ered by § 16(b). If the insider does have other long-term gains and/or short-term or
long-term losses, the actual tax paid on the insider transaction (if indeed, any tax is
incurred) may be more or less than $5. For a more detailed discussion, see note 87
infra & accompanying text.
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it is necessary to determine basis, 54 which is generally cost.55 When
a shareholder sells a portion of a number of shares acquired at dif-
ferent times and/or prices, he must identify, if possible, the specific
stock he is selling in order to determine the basis and holding peri-
od of those shares.56  In determining 16(b) liability, however, no
such identification is required or even desirable. If there has been
a purchase of stock by an insider, followed by a sale within less than
six months at a higher price, then 16(b) liability results regardless
of whether the stock sold was identical to that purchased less than
six months earlier or stock that had been held for a longer period.5"
Thus, if X buys stock at $50, then one year later buys more stock at
$60, and within less than six months sells for $100 the shares bought
over a year ago at $50, he will have a long-term capital gain of $50
but a 16(b) liability of $40. To allow in this situation an ordinary
deduction for the full amount of the repayment would result in a
larger tax benefit than the tax cost to the insider, and would permit
the insider to make a net repayment of less than the insider profit.
In order to avoid this result a part of the deduction should be dis-
allowed under the frustration of public policy rationale so that the
tax benefit exactly equals the tax cost.58
If the transaction results in a capital loss to the insider as well
as a 16(b) profit, then the result should be quite different. If the
insider bought stock at $100, one year later bought stock at $80,
then within less than six months sold for $90 the stock purchased at
$100, there would be a 16(b) profit of $10 and a capital loss of $10.
This, however, should not affect the 16(b) transaction, just as a series
of transactions that result in an economic loss does not prevent a
16(b) profit in the same series of transactions. 9  In either case the
allowance of a capital loss will not frustrate the purpose of 16(b) _
2. The Sale-Purchase Transaction.- The sale-purchase transac-
tion presents a very different situation. Here, the insider sells stock
in his corporation and within six months repurchases it. No taxable
5 41 NT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 1001.
55 INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, § 1012.
56 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(a), (c) (1957).
5
7 Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
58 See notes 74, 75 & accompanying text, infra.
59 See text accompanying note 50, supra.
6o Cf. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951).
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gain is realized." Consequently, since there is no tax cost to the
insider as a result of the sale-purchase transaction, it is unnecessary
to allow him a tax benefit by way of a deduction for the repay-
ment of his profits. To the contrary, allowance of the deduction in
the sale-purchase situation would result in a net payment of less than
the total insider profit.62  Disallowance is therefore necessary to
guarantee payment of the full section 16(b) profit, and no lesser
amount.
Further inquiry, however, must be made to determine whether
disallowance of the deduction in sale-purchase transactions would
contravene or' distort any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.
In general, an insider who has repaid insider profits will be entitled
to an ordinary deduction,' unless some rationale other than the
normal application and interpretation of the appropriate section of
the Internal Revenue Code is raised.64 The "frustration of public
policy" rationale,65 a long-standing doctrine engrafted on the Code
by the courts, could provide a basis for denying deductions in sale-
purchase transactions. Generally, a deduction will be disallowed if
its allowance would frustrate some sharply defined public policy.
Typically, the rationale has been invoked to disallow deductions for
61 The insider in the sale-purchase transaction may have realized a gain on the
sale of his stock. Any gain so realized, however, is a result of the completed purchase-
sale transaction not covered by § 16(b) (i.e., the sale of stock purchased six months
or more previously), and is, thus, totally unrelated to the sale-purchase transaction
which could result in liability under § 16(b) for the insider.
62 If our hypothetical director-insider X sold stock for $20 and within six months
thereafter purchased an equal number of shares of the stock for $10, he would pay no
tax at the time of purchase. Assuming that he is in a 50-percent tax bracket, a deduction
in the amount of the repayment, $10, would save him $5, so that the net repayment to
the corporation would amount to merely $5 instead of the full profit of $10 required
by section 16(b).
63 To date, the cases considering the repayment-deduction issue have all involved
insiders who were officers and/or directors. Although a shareholder-insider might
have more difficulty in obtaining a deduction, for the purpose of the discussion at this
point, I have assumed that even the shareholder-insider would be entitled to some type
of deduction under the Internal Revenue Code. For a more detailed discussion of the
shareholder-insider problem, see text accompanying notes 87-100 infra.
64 None of the cases decided to date have disallowed a deduction on the grounds
that the insider was not entitled to the deduction within the meaning of the appropriate
deduction provision of the Internal Revenue Code. The Davis and Lehman courts
disallowed the deductions claimed on the grounds of frustration of public policy. The
Tax Court in Marks, Mitchell, and Anderson allowed the deductions. The Sixth Cir-
cuit, in Mitchell, held that a determination of whether the petitioner would ordinarily
be entitled to a deduction was unncessary because the Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil deci-
sions precluded allowance of the deduction in any event.
6 5 See generally J. CHOMMIBE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 42 (1968).
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payments that were illegal, such as bribes or "kickback" payments, 6
or that were paid as a result of an illegal activity, such as a fine."
Allowance of a deduction in a sale-purchase transaction, as we have
seen, permits the insider to retain a part of his profit in the form of
a tax benefit. Eliminating the deduction, on the other hand, results
in the repayment of the full section 16(b) profit. Therefore, since
deductions in sale-purchase transactions frustrate the public policy
of section 16(b), they should be disallowed under the frustration of
public policy rationale of the Internal Revenue Code.
An argument could be made against this treatment of the sale-
purchase situation. In one sense, it could be argued, the insider
has more "invested" in the stock that he last purchased than his basis
for tax purposes will show. If he had sold stock for $20 and re-
purchased stock for $10, his basis in the repurchased stock would
be $10. As a result of the repayment of the 16(b) profit, however,
he will be out not only the $10 that he paid for the stock, but the
$10 that he had to repay to the corporation as well, a total of $20.
Thus, if he were to sell the stock for $15, he would have to re-
port a $5 capital gain even though he had spent $20 at the time he
acquired the stock and suffered a $5 loss as a result of the sale. It
would seem, therefore, that the insider should be entitled to some-
thing in the nature of a basis adjustment to offset this inequity,
similar to that received when brokerage fees are incurred in the pur-
chase of capital assets. 6
The two situations, however, are not analogous. When broker-
age fees are incurred in the purchase of a capital asset, a basis ad-
justment is allowed because the fee is an integral part of the trans-
action. In fact, it is likely that the transaction would not take place
at all without the services that the fee represents. The expense in-
volved in the repayment of insider profit, however, is not a function
of the purchase at all; rather, that expense comes about as a conse-
66See, e.g., Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d
439 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 950 (1963).
67 See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958). The frustration of public pol-
icy doctrine became more securely entrenched in the deduction provisions of the tax
law when Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In it, Congress enacted much
of what had been the judicial gloss of the frustration of public policy doctrine. Con-
gress amended section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code to preclude deductions,
in whole or in part, for a payment which was a bribe, fine or penalty, or antitrust dam-
ages. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,83 Stat. 487.
68See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e) (1958). While expenses incurred in the acquisi-
tion of capital assets are treated as adjustments to basis, expenses incurred in the sale
of such assets are an offset against the amount realized. Id.
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quence of the status of the insider, i.e., that he is an officer, director,
or more-than-10-percent shareholder. Without the integral relation-
ship between the expense and the sale, the basis adjustment is not
proper, and no such adjustment should be made."'
There are two specific types of sale-purchase transactions which
deserve comment at this point. These are the "short sale" and the
"sale against the box."' 70  In the short-sale transaction,7' the seller
sells securities which he does not own at the time of the sale. He
must borrow the securities to deliver them to the purchaser and, at
some later time, must buy the same securities in the market to "cov-
er," that is, to deliver the securities to the person from whom he
borrowed them. Obviously, in such a transaction the short seller
hopes to make a profit by selling for a higher price than the price at
which he must later purchase to cover. This sale-purchase trans-
action, unlike the one discussed previously, does produce realized
gain which is taxable.7' Therefore, if the insider engages in a short
sale of his corporation's equity securities and the short sale produces
realized gain, he should be afforded the same treatment as if the
short sale had been a purchase-sale: he should receive a deduction
equal to the amount of his repayment of the insider profits.
Just as the short sale is a special type of section 16(b) sale-
purchase transaction, the sale against the box is a special ver-
sion of the short sale. It too is more akin to the purchase-sale than
the sale-purchase transaction because it can produce realized taxable
gain.73  In this transaction the seller begins a short sale by selling
securities and delivering borrowed securities to the purchaser. How-
ever, the seller also owns the same security which he is selling short.
If the price rises, instead of buying in the market to cover, the seller
simply delivers to the lender the securities which he already owned.
If the price falls after the sale, the seller will buy in the market and
deliver those securities while he retains the securities he owned at
69 But see, Lokken, supra note 5, at 320.
70 It should be noted that short sales and sales against the box by directors or of-
ficers of the issue, or a beneficial owner of 10 percent of any class of the issuer's securi-
ties, are prohibited by section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §
78p(c) (1970). This, however, does not change the fact that they may be violations
of § 16(b) as well.
71 The classic definition and description of a short sale is found in Provost v. United
States, 269 U.S. 443, 450-53 (1926).
72 Section 12 33(a) of the Code provides that gain or loss from a short sale shall be
viewed in the same way as gain or loss from the exchange of a capital asset. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1233.
73 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1233, is applicable, by its own terms, to sales against
the box as well as to the normal short sale.
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the time of the sale. The sale against the box is thus simply a safer
short sale, because the securities which the seller owns at the time
of the sale enable him to cut his loss on the short sale if the price
of the securities is higher when he must cover.
In any event, the short sale and the sale against the box have
the economic effect of a purchase-sale transaction even though they
are cast in the form of a sale-purchase. Consequently, if an insider
engages in a short sale or sale against the box, realizes a profit,
pays income tax on his profit and later is required to repay the profit
under section 16(b), he should receive the same tax treatment as if
he had engaged in a purchase-sale transaction which violated sec-
tion 16(b).
3. Repayment in Subsequent Tax Years.- Another situation
which requires careful analysis is the repayment of section 16(b)
profits in a tax year subsequent to the year in which the insider real-
ized a short-term capital gain in a purchase-sale transaction. If the
insider's tax bracket for the tax year in which the repayment is made
is the same as his bracket during the year of the realization of the
gain, there is no difficulty in allowing the deduction to the insider,
since the tax benefit from the deduction exactly offsets his tax cost.
A more difficult situation arises, however, if the insider is in a
different tax bracket in the year of repayment than he was in the
year when the short-term capital gain was realized. Suppose that the
insider is in a higher tax bracket in the year in which the repayment
is made. If a deduction of the full amount of the repayment is
allowed, the insider will obtain a tax benefit in excess of his tax cost
from the short-term capital gain recognized in the prior lower-brack-
et year.74 This situation should not, however, render inappropriate
the use of the public policy approach. If the entire amount of a
deduction can be denied on the grounds that its allowance would
violate public policy, then one should certainly be able to deny part
of a deduction on the same grounds. Thus, only that part of the de-
duction which would create tax savings equal to the income tax
paid on the short-term capital gain should be allowed.75
On the other hand, suppose that the insider is in a lower tax
bracket in the year of repayment. Even if the taxpayer were allowed
a deduction for the full amount of his repayment, his tax savings
74 If X made a § 16(b) profit of $10 in a year in which he was in a 40-percent tax
bracket and repaid the $10 in a subsequent 50-percent tax bracket year, he would have
a tax cost of $4 in the first year but receive a tax benefit of $5 in the second year. His
net payment would therefore be only $9 instead of the full amount of the $10 profit.
75 In the example in note 74 supra the deduction would be $8.
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would be less than the tax paid on the short-term capital gain.
This difference would result in an out-of-pocket cost to the insider
of an amount in excess of the profit section 16(b) requires him to
repay.
To provide the insider in this situation with a tax savings equal
to his tax cost it would be necessary to allow him a deduction in
excess of the amount of his repayment. But it is questionable
whether this can be done under the provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. The frustration of public policy rationale, permitting
the disallowance of deductions under certain circumstances, cannot
be applied to create a greater deduction than that to which the
insider is actually entitled on the basis of his repayment. It is one
thing to narrow the scope of the tax law, as when less than the en-
tire amount of the deduction is allowed, but quite another to expand
the deduction allowed beyond the express terms of the tax law.
However, the "claim-of-right" doctrine as codified in section 1341
of the Internal Revenue Code76 may allow for such an expanded
deduction. Section 1341 (a) (5), if applicable, would permit the in-
sider to subtract from the taxes he is required to pay in a lower brack-
et repayment year the amount of savings which he would have real-
ized had he taken a deduction for the repayment in the year that he
realized the section 16(b) profit. Thus, by employing the claim-of-
right doctrine, the insider could enjoy a tax savings upon repayment
equal to his tax cost upon receipt of the insider profit, and the policy
of section 16(b) would be promoted since the profit, and no greater
amount, would be repaid.
Because the policy of 16(b) requires the disallowance of a deduc-
tion for repayments pursuant to sale-purchase transactions,77 the claim
of right doctrine need be considered only in the context of the
purchase-sale transaction. In order to qualify for treatment under
section 1341, an insider who has engaged in a purchase-sale trans-
action that violates section 16(b) must show that:
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable
year (or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unre-
stricted right to such item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was
established after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that
the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to
a portion of such item; and
(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3000 . ... 7
7 6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341.
7 7 See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
78 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1341 (a).
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The greatest obstacle to the application of section 1341 to 16(b)
repayments is posed by Revenue Ruling 68-153.'g This ruling sets
forth the Service's interpretation of the section 1341 (a) (1) require-
ment that the taxpayer appear to have had an unrestricted right to
the funds when received. The Service ruled that section 1341 was
inapplicable to funds received under a mistake of fact, since a tax-
payer does not have an unrestricted right to an item if, on the basis
of facts not actually known to the taxpayer but available at the time
of receipt of the item, the liability to repay is dear.
Although the typical section 16(b) violation involves funds re-
covered under a mistake of law, rather than of fact, the former
should not justify a different result under Revenue Ruling 68-153; in
either event, information establishing the obligation to repay is
available at the time of receipt of the funds.
It could be argued, however, that Revenue Ruling 68-153 should
not be followed, at least as it applies to repayments by insiders under
section 16(b). The position of the Service, in light of the lan-
guage of section 1341(a) (1) which states that there need be a mere
"appearance" of an unrestricted right to an item, is unsupported.
This language would seem to indicate that Congress intended sec-
tion 1341 to operate where the taxpayer has a bona fide belief that
he has an unrestricted right to funds, even though information to
the contrary may be available.
Significantly, section 1341 seems to be the only path available
for an insider seeking a deduction in an amount greater than his
repayment. As we have seen, the frustration of public policy ra-
tionale is inapplicable.8" Therefore, unless the claim-of-right doc-
trine can be successfully employed, the deduction taken by an in-
sider who makes his repayment in a lower-bracket tax year must
be limited to the amount of the repayment, and that will be less
than the tax paid.
4. Multiple Purchase-Sale Transactions.- Another problem
area involves the multiple purchase-sale transaction which occurs
when the insider makes two or more purchases and sales of his cor-
poration's stock within six months. A special rule has evolved for
determining the 16(b) profit for such a series of transactions. The
case of Smolowe v. Delendo Corp."' contains the dearest expression
of this rule, which has been paraphrased as follows:
79 Rev. Rul. 153, 1968-1 Cum. BULL. 371.
80 See text accompanying notes 75, 76 supra.
81 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
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Listed in one column are all the purchases made during the peri-
od for which recovery of profits is sought. In another column is
[sic] listed all of the sales during that period. Then the shares
purchased at the low~st price are matched against an equal number
of the shares sold at the highest price within six months of such
purchase, and the profit computed. After that the next lowest
price is matched against the next highest price and that profit is
computed. Then, the process is repeated until all the shares in the
purchase column which may be matched against shares sold for
higher prices in the sales column have been matched off ...
The gross recovery is the sum of the profits thus determined. 2
To illustrate the Smolowe rule, let us suppose that our hypothetical
insider made the following purchases and sales, each of the same
amount of stock and at the prices indicated below:
Date Purchase Sale
June 1, 1972 $100 $130
July 1, 1972
July 15, 1972 140
July 31, 1972 170
August 1, 1972 180
October 15, 1972 150
Total $420 $450
In this particular series of transactions, the taxpayer would realize
a short-term capital gain of $30, assuming that the stock involved
in these transactions is all of the stock owned by the insider. But
his section 16(b) "profit" would be $8 0.8 Thus, as this exam-
ple clearly shows, the 16(b) profit may be a different amount than
the actual gain realized on a multiple purchase-sale transaction.
As in other transactions the insider should only be allowed to
deduct that part of his repayment which produces a tax benefit equal
to his tax cost. For example, if the insider in the example above is
in a 50-percent tax bracket, he will incur a short-term capital gains
tax of $15 on his $30 of realized gain. In addition, the insider can
offset a short-term capital loss incurred in the transactions against a
short-term capital gain of $30 in the example, thus "losing" the bene-
fit of a $30 setoff upon repayment.84  Therefore, only $30 of the
$80 repayment should be permitted as a deduction.85 Allowance of
82 Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Informa-
tion by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468, 482-83 (1947) (emphasis added).
83 The lowest purchase price was $100. and the highest sale was $170. hence a
$70 § 16(b) profit. The next lowest purchase price and highest sale price were $140
and $150, respectively, resulting in a $10 § 16 (b) profit. Since loss transactoas do not
affect 16(b) computations, the process stops here with a total 16(b) profit of $80.
84 The situation is somewhat more complex if the short-term loss is offset against
long-term capital gain or ordinary income. See pp. 353-54 infra.
85 The multiple purchase-sale problem might be made more complex if the repay-
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any greater amount would, in effect, permit the insider to keep a
portion of his gain.
5. Computation of Actual Tax Cost.- It is essential to compute
the tax cost of a section 16(b) repayment correctly, because it is
this cost which eventually determines the amount of the deduction
which should be permitted. In some cases the actual tax cost will
differ from the amount of taxes actually paid. For this reason,
even though short-term capital gains are in many instances taxed at
the taxpayer's ordinary income tax rate, it is not sufficient in all
cases to compute the tax cost by simply multiplying the realized
gain by the insider's marginal tax rate. Suppose, for example, that
an insider realizes a short-term capital gain of $100 in a transaction
which violates section 16(b). If, in the same year, in a transaction
not covered by section 16(b), he has a short-term capital loss of
$50, the net short-term capital gain upon which the insider must pay
taxes would be $50. Assuming that the insider has neither long-
term capital gains nor long-term capital losses, and assuming also
that he is in a 50-percent tax bracket, the tax incurred on his insider
profit would be $25. However, the total actual tax cost the insider
incurred as a result of the insider trading is more than the $25 tax
he is required to pay. In addition to the tax paid, the insider has
lost the benefit of his short-term capital loss which might otherwise
have shielded other income. Had it not been for the short-term
capital gain realized in the insider trade, the insider would have had
his $50 short-term loss available to offset his ordinary income, which
would have produced a tax savings of $25. Thus the total actual tax
cost to the insider in this situation is $50, or the sum of the $25 tax
paid and the $25 in tax savings lost. Therefore, if the insider in
this case is required to repay his $100 insider profit, he should be
allowed the full $100 as a deduction. This deduction, at a tax rate
of 50 percent, would produce a tax benefit of $50 to completely off-
set the $50 actual tax cost.
ment is made in a tax year subsequent to the year of the gain, and in that subsequent
year the taxpayer's tax bracket has changed. If the insider's bracket is higher in the
year of the repayment even less of the repayment should be allowed as a deduction; if
his tax bracket has risen to 60 percent, $25 (instead of $30 as in the example in the
text) will produce $15 in tax benefits to offset the tax cost If the insider's bracket
has decreased to 40 percent, for example, he may receive better treatment in the multiple
purchase-sale transaction than in the normal purchase-sale. In the simple purchase-
sale, the insider cannot completely offset his tax cott because to do so would require a
deduction in an amount greater than the actual repayment. In the multiple purchase-
sale, however, the insider can offset the tax cost; this is so because in this situation the re-
payment is greater than. the taxable gain. In the example, the insider can completely
offset his tax cost by deducting $37.50.
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More complex is the situation where there is a long-term capital
loss which is set off against a part or all of the short-term capital
gain produced in the 16(b) transaction. Here the actual tax cost
will depend on how the long-term loss would be used to shield other
income had the short-term gain not been made. 6
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine in detail all of
the situations that might arise where special care must be taken to
precisely calculate the actual tax cost of an insider profit because the
insider has other short-term gains or losses, for long-term gains or
loses. It is sufficient to point out that in these situations very care-
ful analysis is required to insure that the amount allowed as a de-
duction will exactly offset the actual tax cost to the insider.
6. Shareholder-Insider Transactions.- A shareholder who is not
a director or officer of the corporation may nevertheless be deemed
an insider under section 16(b) if he owns r-ore than 10 percent of
any class of equity security in the corporation.87 If, however, a share-
holder-insider is required to make a section 16(b) repayment, he
will not be able to claim an ordinary and necessary business expense
deduction under section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code since
the status of being a shareholder is not a business. Consequently,
if a shareholder-insider is to be afforded treatment equal to that
afforded director-insiders and officer-insiders under section 162(a),
the shareholder-insider must take advantage of some other provision
of the Internal Revenue Code. The most appropriate provision is
section 212 of the Code, which provides a deduction for all the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year for the production or collection of income; for the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the produc-
tion of income; or in connection with the determination, collection,
or refund of any tax.88
86 See generally INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201, 1202, 1211, 1212, 1222.
87 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
88 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212. Section 212 was enacted specifically to provide
an individual who was not engaged in a business, a deduction for ordinary and necessary
expenses similar to the business expenses which could be deducted by individuals en-
gaged in a business under § 162 (a). In discussing this point, Professor Chommie has
stated:
Although the concept of "trade or business" contained in section 162 (a) is
broad, embracing both employees and professionals, the Supreme Court in
1941 in Higgins v. Commissioner, [312 U.S. 212 (1941)] restricted its mean-
ing as applied to an investor who maintained an office for handling his security
and property investments. A deduction for the expenses of maintaining the
office was denied on the grounds the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or
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None of the cases decided to date, however, have involved a
shareholder-insider. Therefore, it is unclear whether the share-
holder-insider would be entitled to a deduction for the repayment
of insider profits even under section 212. Although there is no case
authority on the repayment-deduction issue, a case discussing the
deductibility of dividends repaid by a shareholder to his corporation
may support the allowance of a deduction to the shareholder-insider.
In Estate of Crellin v. Commissioner,89 taxpayers had repaid dividends
which had been declared and paid to them in the same tax year.
The court held that the dividends were includable in the taxpay-
ers' gross incomes, even though the dividends had been repaid in
the same tax year in which they had been declared and paid, be-
cause the dividends had been repaid voluntarily. However, the
Crellin court stated in dictum that if dividends were paid in one
year and were repaid in a subsequent year under circumstances in
which the repayment of dividends could have been compelled, the
shareholder would be entitled to a deduction. 0 The Crellin dictum
could apply specifically to a shareholder-insider who repays his sec-
tion 16(b) profit. Whether a lawsuit had been initiated prior to
the repayment or not, it can certainly be said that the 16(b) repay-
ment could have been compelled. Therefore, by analogy to Crel-
lin, the shareholder-insider should be entitled to a section 212 deduc-
tion for his repayment of insider profits.91
An additional basis for allowing the shareholder-insider a de-
business within the meaning of section 162(a). The reaction of Congress
was the enactment of what is now section 212 of the Code which provides a
separate non-business expense category. J. CHOMMIE, supra note 65, § 40 at
68.
89 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 873 (1943).
'90 The court stated that:
The Lesoine case [United States v. Lesoine, 203 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1953)) is
authority for the proposition that if a dividend is received in a given year
under a claim of right and without restriction as to use, but in a subsequent
year the invalidity of the dividend is established and its return compelled,
the amount so returned is nonetheless taxable in the year received. If the re-
payment could have been compelled, however, the stockholder is entitled to a
deduction in the year of repayment. Id. at 814.
91 Although the dictum in Crellin concerned the repayment of a dividend in a year
subsequent to the year in which it was received, the dictum, when applied to the share-
holder-insider problem, ought to support the section 212 deduction even where the re-
payment occurs in the same tax year as the gain was realized as long as the repayment
could have been compelled under law. Presumably, the Crellin dictum discussed a
subsequent repayment because such a repayment would require a deduction to offset
the inclusion of the dividend in the taxable income of an earlier year. If the dividend
has been repaid in the same year (and its repayment could have been compelled), the
dividend would not be includable in the taxpayer's taxable income in the first place,
thus obviating the necessity for a deduction.
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duction in the purchase-sale transaction is the very purpose of sec-
tion 16(b).92 A failure to consider the tax consequences of deduc-
tion by the shareholder-insider of his section 16(b) profits may
contravene the policy of 16(b) by causing the repayment of either
more or less than the amount of "profit" required to be repaid un-
der section 16(b). Moreover, section 16(a), without distinguish-
ing among them, covers officers and directors of any issuer which
has any equity security registered under section 12 of the Exchange
Act and any shareholder who directly or indirectly is the beneficial
owner of more than 10 percent of any class of any equity security
registered under section 12. Thus, in light of the policy of section
16(b) and the purpose of section 212 of the Code, it is necessary
that all insiders, whether officers, directors, or more-than-10-percent
shareholders, be treated similarly under the tax law. The dissent in
the Anderson case supports the view that all insiders must be given
the same tax treatment, although it would differ from my view of
what that treatment should be:93
[U]nresolved by the majority opinion is whether different treat-
ment should be accorded directors and shareholders affected by sec-
tion 16(b). Is a shareholder who, either voluntarily or under
some form of compulsion, makes a repayment of his "insider" prof-
it to a corporation entitled only to a capital loss deduction while an
officer of the same company is entitled to an ordinary-loss deduc-
tion? Is a corporate director who receives minimal directors fees
from the corporation entitled to an ordinary-loss deduction under
similar circumstances? I think not. It is my view that officers,
directors and "10 percent" shareholders should all be treated as
investors with respect to trading in the capital stock of their com-
panies. . . . Any gains or losses from the sale of their stock, as
well as profits they might be required to restore to their companies
under section 16(b), should be consistently treated. No sound rea-
son for bifurcating these transactions has been advanced in the ma-
jority opinion.94
Finally, a shareholder-insider might be eligible for a capital loss
deduction under section 165(c) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which provides a deduction for losses incurred in any transaction
entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or busi-
ness.95  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Weir v. Commis-
92 See notes 52-60 supra & accompanying text.
93 The dissent would have affirmed the Commissioner's decision that only a capital
loss should be allowed for the repayment of insider profits, as opposed to this writer's
view that an ordinary loss should be allowed the insider in the purchase-sale transac-
tion and no deduction of any kind should be allowed in the sale-purchase situation.
I4 56 T. C. at 1378 (dissenting opinion; emphasis added).
95 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (c) (2).
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sione9 established that the purchase and sale of stock, in most in-
stances, is a "transaction entered into for profit" under section 165
(c) (2): "IT]he intention to purchase stock must from the very na-
ture of the thing purchased include the intention to receive profits
(dividends or accretion in value) unless the purchaser knows at
the time of purchase that such profits are an impossibility." 7
Nevertheless, the application of section 165 (c) (2) to the share-
holder-insider situation is not without problems. Under 165 (c) (2),
the insider-shareholder must demonstrate that the repayment of
16(b) profit was a loss "incurred in" the purchase and sale of stock.
Arguably, the repayment of 16(b) profit by a shareholder-insider
is a loss incurred in the purchase and sale of stock for profit be-
cause the obligation to make the repayment would not have arisen
but for the shareholder-insider's stock trading activities.98 In addi-
tion, as a policy gonsideration, section 165 (c) (2) should be con-
strued to allow the shareholder-insider a deduction in order to
provide for the equal treatment of shareholder-insiders and director-
insiders or officer-insiders. Such treatment is consonant with the
policy underlying section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.
An allowance of a deduction under section 165 (c) (2), however,
does not completely resolve the shareholder-insider's dilemma. De-
ductions under section 165 are subject to the limitations imposed
under section 1211 of the Code, which provides that "losses from
sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the ex-
tent of the gains from such sales or exchanges."9 9 Stocks are cer-
tainly capital assets within the definition of section 1221. Thus,
assuming that the shareholder-insider would qualify for a deduction
under section 165 (c) (2) for the amount of his repayment, he would
be limited, nevertheless, to a capital loss deduction. For this reason
the deduction under 212 is to be preferred.
In any event, a shareholder-insider who is permitted a deduction
under sections 212 or 165 should receive the same treatment as a di-
rector-insider or an officer-insider. Of course, the public policy ra-
tionale should also be applied to the shareholder-insider. Gener-
ally, in the purchase-sale situation, the shareholder-insider should be
allowed a deduction which would neutralize the tax cost of the trans-
action. If the repayment occurs in a subsequent tax year, the amount
96 109 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
97 Id. at 997.
98 But see note 68 supra & accompanying text.
99 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1211.
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allowed as a deduction should depend upon the insider's tax bracket
in that subsequent year. If the insider's tax bracket in the year of
the repayment is the same as or lower than it was in the year of the
gain, and the gain was short-term, the entire repayment should be
allowed as a deduction. If, however, the insider's tax bracket in the
year of the repayment is greater than it was in the year of the gain,
only that portion of the repayment which would produce a tax bene-
fit equal to the income tax paid on the gain should be allowed.'
C. Some Anticipated Arguments Against the
Public Policy Approach
As noted previously, the public policy approach suggested in this
paper is not easily applied to every situation that might arise.
Furthermore, there are several objections which might be raised to
applying the public policy rationale to the repayment-deduction is-
sue. Three of the major criticisms are discussed in this section.
1. Revenue Ruling 61-115.- The first argument against the
application of the public policy rationale might be based upon a
revenue ruling promulgated in 1961. In Revenue Ruling 61-115,"ol
the Service stated that a deduction should not be disallowed for
the repayment of insider profits on the grounds that allowance of the
deduction would frustrate public policy. According to the Service:
The purpose of [§ 16(b) of the Exchange Act] is to place the in-
sider in the same position he would have occupied if he had never
engaged in the stock dealings. This purpose is not frustrated by
the allowance of a tax deduction for amounts paid by reason of
section 16(b); but, rather, the allowance of the deduction is con-
sistent with the purpose of the statute in returning the insider to
his original position. 02
It is apparent from the above statement that the Service has
analyzed neither section 16(b) nor its own position very closely.
The purpose of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act is not "to place
the insider in the same position he would occupy if he had never
engaged in the stock dealings" which lead to section 16(b) liabil-
ity. As is stated explicitly in section 16(b), its purpose is to prevent
"the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer.....,oS To effectuate this purpose, 16(b) re-
100 See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
101 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 46.
102 Id. at 48.
10 3 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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quires the disgorgement of "any profit realized" in the insider trad-
ing. The purpose of 16(b) must be served irrespective of whether
the repayment of insider profits places the insider in the same posi-
tion he would have enjoyed had he not engaged in the proscribed in-
sider transaction. 04
The nonviability of the Service's position in Revenue Ruling 61-
115 becomes dear in those situations in which section 16(b) does
not put the insider in the same position he would have been in had
he not engaged in the insider transaction.
The most graphic illustration of this is the situation where after
a series of transactions covered by section 16(b) the insider has suf-
fered an economic loss, but which also results in a 16(b) "profit."' 0 5
Here it is clear that the section does not attempt to put the insider
in the same position as he would have been had he not engaged in
the insider trade.
Secondly, if it were true that section 16(b)'s purpose is to place
the insider in the same position after the insider transaction that he
would have enjoyed had he not engaged in the insider transaction,
different tax treatment would be necessary in the sale-purchase trans-
action in order to attain this end. The allowance of an ordinary
deduction, or a capital loss deduction as proposed by the Service,
would not restore the insider-taxpayer to the position he occupied
before the insider transaction. For example, if X, in a 50-percent
tax bracket, sold stock at $90, repurchased an identical number of
shares at $10 and repaid his profit of $80, a deduction of $80 would
not restore his pretrade position. In order to restore the insider to his
pretrade position, a basis adjustment would be necessary. His basis
in the stock he now owns is $10; however, if the intent is to restore
him to his pretrade position, then his basis should be adjusted to re-
flect the $80 repayment, and he should be given a new basis of $90.
But, there is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code which allows for
such a basis adjustment.' Therefore, Revenue Ruling 61-115 not
only misunderstands the purpose of section 16(b) but also applies
this misunderstanding inconsistently.
2. The Tax Reform Act of 1969.- As was mentioned pre-
viously, in 1969 Congress amended section 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code by enumerating situations in which deductions
104 See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951).
105 See note 49 .rupra & accompanying text.
'
0 6 See note 69 supra & accompanying text.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 330
should be disallowed because of public policy. 107 This amend-
ment and its legislative history might serve as the basis for a second
criticism of the public policy approach. The Tax Reform Act of
1969 enacted into statutory law much of what had previously been
judicial gloss surrounding section 162(a). Furthermore, the legis-
lative history of the amendment states that "[pjublic policy, in
other circumstances [that is, other than the provisions specifically
enacted through the 1969 Tax Reform Act], generally is not suf-
ficiently clearly defined to justify the disallowance of deductions.' 10 8
This quoted portion of the legislative history might imply that
the amendment to section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code was
a codification of all the recognized public policy grounds for disal-
lowance.
Any argument, however, against the continued vitality of the
public policy rationale, beyond that which is codified in the 1969
amendments, can be overcome by the language of the legislative
history. The Committee Report stated that "generally" public policy
in areas other than those covered by the 1969 amendments is not clear
enough to sustain the disallowance of deductions. However, the
policy underlying section 16(b) ought to be one of the exceptions
to that general rule. The insider abuses which precipitated the en-
actment of section 16(b) are well known. 109 If ever there was leg-
islation which epitomizes a specific, dear, and well-defined public
policy, it is section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.
3. The Public Policy Rationale Has Been Rejected by the Courts.
- One final major argument which might be marshalled against
the public policy approach is that it has already been rejected by
the courts which have considered the repayment-deduction issue.
Those advancing this criticism would point out that the Marks deci-
sion held that the allowance of a deduction to an insider is not
against public policy. Furthermore, critics would emphasize that
the public policy argument has not even been discussed in the repay-
ment-deduction cases subsequent to the Marks decision. Although
these statements are true, it is arguable whether they support the no-
tion that the courts have rejected the public policy rationale. It
would be more accurate to say that after Davis the courts have
simply ignored public policy.
107 See note 67 supra.
108 SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM Acr OF 1969, S. REP. No. 552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1969) (emphasis added).
109 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CuRRENCY, STOcK EXCHANGE PRACTIcEs,
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
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The Tax Court's unexplained distinguishing of the facts in Marks
from those of Davis can hardly be termed a rejection of the Davis
public policy argument. The cases subsequent to Marks did not
even consider the public policy argument, let alone reject it. It is,
therefore, difficult to glean from any of the cases following Davis
a clear rejection of the public policy argument.
V. CONCLUSION
As should be evident from the foregoing discussion, the repay-
ment-deduction issue does not lend itself to simple analysis. This
result stems largely from the overlap of the Exchange Act of 1934
and the Internal Revenue Code. Although, at first glance, these two
federal statutes seem to be in conflict, the issue can be resolved
without rendering one statute subservient to the other. In order to
do so, however, the courts must turn to a rationale which they have
ignored in recent years. This rationale, the frustration of public
policy, which has been a long-standing judicial gloss on the deduc-
tion provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, can adequately handle
the various circumstances in which the repayment-deduction issue is
raised. It should be noted that it is only because of an ambiguity in
the Code that the public policy approach can be used to coordinate
these two statutes. If the Code were absolute in its mandate, then
the coordination would not be possible. The public policy ap-
proach provides enough flexibility to cover both the purchase-sale
and sale-purchase transactions; furthermore, the public policy ra-
tionale can be applied to the shareholder-insider as well as to direc-
tor-insiders and officer-insiders. It is this versatility which commends
the public policy rationale as an appropriate vehicle to resolve the
repayment-deduction issue.
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